My research consists of work on Blameworthiness and Ignorance, the Ethics of Blame and Forgiveness, and Moral Responsibility and Control. More recently I have applied my research to several questions arising in Health Care Ethics. Below are some papers I’ve published on these topics (please cite published versions).
Attributionism identifies attitudes as the locus of direct responsibility. And yet, agents with qualitatively identical attitudes may differ in their responsibility due to a difference in whether they act on them. On the most plausible interpretation of Attributionism, attitude duplicates differ in their responsibility only with respect to the scope of what they’re responsible for. Against this, I argue that attitude duplicates may also differ with respect to their degrees of praiseworthiness, and that this is best explained by either the effort or sacrifice instantiated in one’s actions—explanations unavailable to Attributionism.
A Standing Asymmetry Between Blame & Forgiveness (with Kyle G. Fritz)
Ethics 132(4): 759- 786.
Sometimes it is not one’s place to blame or forgive. This phenomenon is captured under the philosophical notion of standing. However, there is an asymmetry to be explained here. One can successfully blame even if one lacks the standing to do so. Yet, one cannot successfully forgive if one lacks the standing to do so. In this paper we explain this asymmetry.
Two Problems of Moral Luck for Brain-Computer Interfaces
Forthcoming in Journal of Applied Philosophy.
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In this paper I illustrate how the use of Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) leads to two unique and unrecognized problems of moral luck. In short, it seems that agents who depend upon BCIs for bodily movement or the use of other mechanisms (“BCI-agents”) may end up deserving of blame and punishment more so than standard counterparts simply due to bad luck. My aim is to explore whether we can avoid the implication that BCI-agents are subject to these unique sources of moral luck. In doing so I offer a number of possible solutions and then defend a solution that addresses both problems.
Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral Standing (with Kyle G. Fritz)
Forthcoming in Ergo.
Alleged problems for accounts of moral standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. This seems to lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, in addition to hypocrites, there may be hypercrites, who blame themselves more severely than others. Leading accounts of standing would also seem to imply that hypercrites lack the standing to blame others, but some may find this counterintuitive. We argue that neither of these problems poses a unique threat to leading accounts of standing.
Justifying Positive Appeals to Conscience: The Debate We Can’t Avoid
American Journal of Bioethics 21(8): 79-81.
Protecting claims of conscience can function to fairly balance burdens among relevant parties without having to resolve an underlying and intractable moral disagreement. Recently, a number of theorists have argued that the relevant criteria for protecting negative appeals to conscience in health care can (suitably modified) be equally well-satisfied in cases of positive appeals. I argue that, when it comes to certain practices, the justification of positive appeals to conscience does in fact depend upon contested claims in the debate over the moral permissibility of those practices. This fact threatens to undermine one of the central functions of protecting appeals to conscience: that we can agree to disagree.
Can Morally Ignorant Agents Care Enough?
Philosophical Explorations (2021) 24 (2): 155-173.
Theorists are divided over whether moral ignorance is ever exculpatory. While many have argued for the blamelessness of certain morally ignorant agents on grounds concerning reasonable expectation, the possibility that morally ignorant agents might be blameless even according to quality of will views has not been adequately addressed. I illustrate and explain how it is possible for morally ignorant agents to display sufficient care for the morally relevant features of their wrong behavior. Thus, even if quality of will views are correct, moral ignorance sometimes excuses.
BCI-Mediated Behavior, Moral Luck, and Punishment
AJOB Neuroscience (2020) 11(1): 72-74.
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I point to a unique problem of moral luck for agents who depend upon Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) for bodily movement. The problem arises because BCIs may misrecognize a voluntarily formed distal intention (e.g., a plan to commit some illicit act in the future) as a control command to perform some overt behavior now. If so, I argue, it may be that BCI-agents are deserving of punishment for the unlucky but foreseeable outcomes of their voluntarily formed plans, whereas standard counterparts who abandon such plans are not.
The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame (with Kyle G. Fritz)
Ergo (2019) 6(19): 545-569.
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In Fritz and Miller 2018 we offer an argument for the Nonhypocrisy Condition on the moral standing to blame. Recently our account has come under criticism from several authors. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses the challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering this challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer.
When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: A Response to Rossi (with Kyle G. Fritz)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2019) 22(2): 379-384.
In Fritz and Miller 2018 we offer an argument for the Nonhypocrisy Condition on the moral standing to blame. Benjamin Rossi 2018 raises several criticisms of our view. He argues that our account of hypocrisy fails, and thus that we cannot explain why certain hypocrites lack the standing to blame. Here we defend our account from Rossi’s criticisms and emphasize the account’s unique advantage, namely, explaining why hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame.
Sometimes ignorance is a legitimate excuse for morally wrong behavior, and sometimes it isn’t. If someone has secretly replaced my sugar with arsenic, then I’m blameless for putting arsenic in your tea. But if I put arsenic in your tea because I keep arsenic and sugar jars on the same shelf and don’t label them, then I’m plausibly blameworthy for poisoning you. Why is my ignorance in the first case a legitimate excuse, but my ignorance in the second case isn’t? This introductory essay explores the relationship between ignorance and blameworthiness.
Circumstantial Ignorance and Mitigated Blameworthiness
Philosophical Explorations (2019) 22: 33-43
It is intuitive that circumstantial ignorance, even when culpable, can mitigate blameworthiness for morally wrong behavior. In this paper I suggest an explanation of why this is so. The explanation offered is that an agent’s degree of blameworthiness for some action (or omission) depends at least in part upon the quality of will expressed in that action, and that an agent’s level of awareness when performing a morally wrong action can make a difference to the quality of will that is expressed in it.
Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame
(with Kyle G. Fritz)
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2018) 99: 118-139 (2015 online)
Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. While widely accepted, this is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and thereby a rejection of the equality of persons, which we argue grounds the standing to blame others.
Substantive Discussion in:
Todd, P. and Rabern, B. (2021). “The Paradox of Self-Blame.” American Philosophical Quarterly.
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2021). “Praising without Standing.” The Journal of Ethics.
Tierney, H. (2021). “Hypercrisy and Standing to Self-Blame.” Analysis.
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2020). “Why the Moral Equality Account of the Hypocrite’s Lack of Standing to Blame Fails.” Analysis.
Piovarchy, A. (2020). “Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame, and Second-Personal Authority.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Rossi, B. (2020). Hypocrisy is Vicious, Value-Expressing Inconsistency. The Journal of Ethics.
King, M. (2020). “Attending to Blame.” Philosophical Studies.
Rossi, B. (2020). “Feeling Badly Isn’t Good Enough: A Reply to Fritz and Miller.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Todd, P. (2019). “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame.” Nous 53(2): 347-374.
Riedener, S. (2019). “The Standing to Blame, or Why Moral Disapproval Is What It Is.” Dialectica 73: 183-210.
Rossi, B. (2018). “The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21: 553-567.
Roadevin, C. (2018). “Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing.” Metaphilosophy 49: 137-152.
Reasonable Foreseeability and Blameless Ignorance
Philosophical Studies (2017) 174(6): 1561-1581
I argue that versions of the tracing strategy that require reasonable foreseeability (rather than actual foresight) are in tension with the view that blameless ignorance excuses. A stronger version of the tracing strategy (i.e., one that requires actual foresight) is consistent with the view that blameless ignorance excuses and is therefore preferable for tracing theorists who wish to continue maintaining that it does.
I argue that, without historical conditions on blameworthiness for the non-voluntary, non-volitionist (or “attributionist”) accounts are vulnerable to manipulation cases and also fail to make sufficient room for the distinction between badness and blameworthiness. I propose conditions aimed to supplement these deficiencies that are tailored to suit non-volitional accounts, and thus do not require that an agent have exercised voluntary control (e.g., via choices or decisions) over the acquisition of her attitudes or values.